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1     Introduction 
 
In the global automotive sector, China has drawn increasing attention as the 
fastest growing market. The Chinese automotive industry, riding on China’s 
economic restructuring and open policy, has experienced dramatic growth 
during the past 20 years. China’s output of motor vehicles doubled in the period 
between 2001 and 2005, and the country jumped from being the eighth largest 
automotive producer in the world in 2001 to become the third biggest national 
automotive producer and market in 2005. According to the Chinese Automotive 
Industry Association, domestic vehicle production rose to more than 7 million 
units in 2006 (Guangzhou Daily, 2007). However, a few independent domestic 
manufacturers (e.g., Chery and Geely) aside, global auto firms, that is, 
multinational companies who have established manufacturing facilities through 
joint ventures (JV) with Chinese firms, have dominated the growing Chinese 
auto industry. While the Chinese partnering companies have shared the profits 
the industry has generated, they have not been able to develop the skills to 
launch their own competitive brands (Farrell, Gao, & Orr, 2004). Besides the 
foreign alliances, twenty-some domestic carmakers share about 4 percent of the 
market. The lack of technological capability in this latter category has shown in 
their struggle to enter into the competitive North American market. While the 
newly announced alliance between Chrysler and Chery could result in the first 
Chinese-made vehicles being imported to North America, analysts are 
cautioning “that the first wave of Chinese build vehicles are likely to face 
skepticism from American consumers concerned about safety and quality.” 
(Krolicki 2007). As a recent example, European auto distributor Karel has just 
cancelled its sales agreement with Huachen, another best-known Chinese auto 
manufacturer with autonomous technologies, because the company’s product 
failed ADAC crash tests (Wei, 2007). It is from such a perspective that China is 
a large automotive country, but not a strong automotive country (She, 2006). 
Recently, the failure of Chinese auto makers in developing their own 
technological capability has been publicly recognized and forced local 
manufacturers, independents as well as JV partners, to commit their efforts to 
developing indigenous technological competence (Bradsher, 2006). China’s 
experience is in sharp contrast to that of South Korea (hereafter Korea), a 
formidable competitive force alongside Japan. Emerging only in the 1960s, 
Korea has progressed rapidly, building its auto industry to five auto 
manufacturers having a combined global annual sales of more than 5 million 
units in 2009, a comparable level of production to that of the Chinese auto 
industry. The difference is that in the seemingly similar industry-building effort, 
including international technology transfer (TT), Korean auto makers have 
achieved a relatively high level of self-reliance in design technologies, while 
Chinese auto firms remain largely dependent upon foreign counterparts in key 
technologies. 
     What accounts for the differences in technological capability building and the 
different results of TT in Korea and China? While there have been heated 
debates among practitioners, management scholars have been less attentive to 
the issue. In a comparative analysis of Korea versus China, Huang (1997) 
considers the two “coordination failures” in the Chinese auto industry: failure to 
invest at socially optimal levels and failure in excessive investment. The 
conclusion is that a decentralized bureaucratic structure is responsible for the 
fragmentation of automotive manufacturing in China. In a recent study, Zhao, 
Anand, and Mitchell (2005) suggest that the government’s intent of importing 
advanced technologies through IJVs has been compromised by MNCs’ 
relatively centralized R&D efforts. Concerned about unintended leaking, foreign 
partners tend to be tight about key knowledge in dealing with Chinese partners, 
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which could be one of the reasons why R&D intensity in these IJVs is very low 
compared to that in MNCs. Existing research has rarely considered the behavior 
of the Chinese government and individual firms, wherein technological activities 
would ultimately take place (Teech, 1993). Especially, it remains unclear why 
the Chinese government’s technology transfer mandates, through measures such 
as formation of IJVs, have not been fully met. 
     The objective of the current study is to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of Chinese auto firms’ technological innovation behavior. To 
attain this objective, we benchmark China’s experience against that of Korea as 
a successful example in building autonomous technological capability. It is 
difficult to construct a perfect timeframe for the comparison since the 
augmentation of indigenous auto industries in the two countries were at different 
times. The end point for both countries is 2005, when the automotive industry in 
each country exceeded 5 million units. But the starting point is different: it is the 
early 1960s for Korea, whereas it is the late 1970s for China. The early 1960s 
witnessed Korea augmenting industrialization and starting its drive toward the 
status of a developed economy (Kim, 1997). Although China started automotive 
manufacturing at an earlier time, its progress was effectively disrupted by the 
turmoil of the two-decade Cultural Revolution until 1978, when the country re-
emerged with a renewed agenda to modernize its economy. Also, the 
development of the passenger car sector was not a factor in the government’s 
automotive industry plan prior to the early 1980s. Finally, this was also the time 
when China gained unprecedented access to a variety of possibilities for 
international technology transfer (Harwit, 1995), the same possibilities received 
by their Korean counterparts in the early 1960s. As mentioned earlier, 
international technology transfer has been an important ingredient in both 
countries’ industry development effort. 
     Besides offering managerial and policy implications to China and other 
developing countries with similar concerns, this comparative historical approach 
provides an opportunity to advance existing international business theories 
(Jones & Khanna, 2006). Our analysis is limited to the passenger car sector of 
China’s automotive industry, wherein the phenomenon “development without 
technological capacity buildup” is most prominent. However, for convenience, 
we will use the term automotive industry throughout the paper. In the section 
that immediately follows, we review relevant theories and literature to set up a 
theoretical framework. We then compare experiences of the auto industry in 
China to that in Korea. We use secondary data, complemented by our interviews 
with Chinese executives in the auto industry. Following Teece, Pisano, and 
Shuen (1997), we start this comparison with a close look at what happened at the 
firm level and then examine determinants of the firms’ technological activities. 
Finally, we discuss the lessons from the comparative study and conclude with 
theoretical and practical implications. 
 
 
2     Theoretical framework 
 
2.1     Economic development and technological capability 
 
Early economic theory suggests that most national GDP growth can be attributed 
to technological progress (Solow, 1957). For some authors, the economic 
miracle in East Asia during the 1980s has proved to be the pivotal role of 
technological development in economic growth (Kim & Nelson, 2000). While 
many authors assume the central role of technological innovation in economic 
development, nations may vary their level of emphasis on technological 
capability building in the economic development process. Note that there are 
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two different theories with regard to the experiences of these emerging 
economies. The accumulation theory suggests that development is largely 
accounted for by the investment in physical and human capital, and that 
technological advancements are more or less the by-products of economic 
development. On the other hand, the assimilation theory emphasizes 
technological learning and innovation alongside investment in physical and 
human resource investment (Kim & Nelson, 2000). A comparative analysis, 
however, suggests that such divergent views may reflect different experiences 
across countries. Some countries, such as Korea, assumed a deliberate national 
strategy to upgrade domestic technological capabilities, whereas other countries, 
such as Brazil, opted for massive manufacturing expansions with a parallel 
increase in “technological sophistication” (Kaze, 2000, p. 308). While 
comparing newly industrialized economies in Asia, Lall (2000) found 
differences in the levels of local technological capabilities concurrently 
developed with economic growth. Existing literature thus suggests that the 
experience of technology capability building may differ across countries in their 
effort toward development of a particular industry. The next question is: What 
determines a country’s attention, energy, and strategic actions devoted to 
technological competence building during economic development? 
 
2.2     Choices of nations 
 
When considering the deliberation and intensity of technological learning as it 
varies across nations, most authors focus on institutional environments, 
especially in the policy regime. Much has been written on the role of trade 
policies in creating incentives for national technological activities. For example, 
evidence shows that an export orientation is normally a better strategy than 
import-substitution for building technological competence (Lall, 2000). 
However, there are more fundamental incentives that affect a nation’s policies 
with regard to technological activities (Lall, 1992). According to Porter (1990), 
the nature of local demand (e.g., buyer sophistication and competition intensity) 
affects product development and quality management. The size of the domestic 
market also influences the kinds of technological activities that are likely to be 
taken. For example, large countries can foster capabilities in more scale-
sensitive activities than smaller countries (Murphy, Schliefer, & Vishny, 1989). 
In such a case, the government of a large country may adopt an import-
substitution policy by focusing on the buildup of manufacturing capacity. This 
choice seems natural to a developing economy, given their priorities in the areas 
of industrialization and employment. However, an underdeveloped market also 
entails lower requirements with regard to technological sophistication and 
quality. As such, the inward-oriented import substitution policy will not create as 
much of an incentive for intensive technological activities as an export-driven 
policy. 
 
2.3     Modes of international technology transfer 
 
According to neoclassical theory, innovation and technological change are 
exogenous and often associated with international technology transfer (TT). 
Indeed, technologies imported from developed countries provide the most 
important initial input into technological innovation in developing countries 
(Lall, 2000). However, different modes of TT are differentially associated with 
the levels of learning effectiveness. In auto manufacturing, a developing country 
can choose between incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) and the market in 
facilitating TT (Maxcy, 1981). Generally, FDI or internalized modes of TT are 
very efficient for transferring know-how that involves the attainment of a 
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minimum level of operational capability, but less so for transferring know-why, 
that is, the ability to understand the principles of the technology. In contrast, 
licensing or other arm’s-length externalized modes of TT are  more effective for 
generating local know-why, but may be more expensive in the short term for 
accessing know-how, and they do not allow access to those new technologies 
that are not for sale (Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2005). Know-how-oriented learning is 
important as it allows a developing-country firm to quickly reap the benefit of 
starting manufacturing without the costs of “reinventing the wheel.” Know-why-
oriented learning tends to be more costly and risky, yet allows the firm to select 
more efficiently the new technologies they need, adapt and improve them more 
effectively, and develop autonomous innovative capabilities (Nelson, 1993). 
 
2.4     Technological activities within firms 
 
Though macroeconomic variables in the development process have received the 
most attention, technological transfer and innovation ultimately take place within 
business firms (Teece, 1993). National technological capabilities develop when 
individual firms accumulate technological capabilities at the micro level (Kim & 
Nelson, 2000). Business historians have long associated national competitive 
advantage with the development of specific organizational capabilities and the 
institutions that utilize these capabilities (Chandler, 1990). To account for the 
circumstances under which local innovation is strong, some authors argue for an 
effective national innovation system with property rights and rule of law as key 
elements (Gwartney & Holcombe, 1999) as well as a positive cultural and social 
environment (Audretsch & Thurik, 2002). The emerging literature on 
organizational learning has quickly accumulated a stock of knowledge on why 
and how individual firms engage in learning and innovation. For instance, 
parallel to the macro-level concern with incentive regime (Lall, 1996), the 
management scholars (e.g., Hamel, 1991) identify an articulated learning 
intention as a critical antecedent to effective learning. Indeed, learning involves 
conscious decisions and deliberate activities, rather than the mere accumulation 
of production experience (Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2005). According to the dynamic 
capability view, a firm’s competence and capabilities rest fundamentally on 
organizational processes, market positions, and paths (Teece et al., 1997). 
Informed by this view, firms in emerging economies may catch up and even 
overtake counterparts in the developed world by selecting better processes and 
paths, given constraints from industry dynamics (Teece, 2000). While Western-
derived theories, including the dynamic capability view of the firm, are 
relatively silent with respect to institutional context, research on organizational 
learning and innovation should give more weight to factors embedded in such 
contexts, including corporate governance. For example, recent research suggests 
that conditions in family-controlled business, such as concentration of ownership 
and longer managerial tenure, allow the owners the discretion, incentive, 
knowledge, and resources to engage in long-term investment activities, including 
knowledge creation (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2004). However, the 
assumption that the development of private entrepreneurship serves as a profit-
motivated agent of technological change is not universally held. State control 
and institutional discriminations against private entrepreneurs remain a facet of 
life in much of the developing world (Peng, Stanislav, & Shekshnia, 2001). 
     In summary, existing literature suggests a conceptual framework (Figure 1) 
for national technological capability building by taking into account market 
conditions, institutional environment, international technology transfer, and 
finally the innovation behavior of the local firms. 
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3     Technological activities in the auto industry: comparing China 
with Korea 
 
3.1     Technology appropriation in industry development 
 
The year  2005  witnessed a milestone  for the  automotive  industry in both 
Korea and China, when auto production in each country exceeded 5 million 
units. However, there is a fundamental difference between the two countries: 
whereas automobiles made in Korea have enjoyed a reputation for quality and 
innovation and thus experience success in competitive overseas markets (Hyun, 
1995), automobiles made in China are dominated by brands owned by MNC 
auto makers, and indigenous Chinese brands are considered low in quality and 
have difficulty entering the international marketplace, especially the competitive 
North American market (Zhong, 2006). 
     In developing their automotive industry, both China and Korea have taken 
advantage of technology transfer from advanced countries, an approach adopted 
by most less developed countries in their drive toward industrialization (Kim & 
Nelson, 2000). According to the model of the technology appropriation process, 
less developed countries normally follow a consecutive path to develop their 
technological capacity as they create and grow an indigenous automotive 
industry. Apparently, this has been the case in Korea. Amsden and Kang (1995) 
observed that the Korean automotive industry progressed from complete knock-
down (CKD) manufacturing to mass production of a single model, and finally to 
the export of a wide range of models. According to Kim (2001, 2003), Korean 
auto firms have sequentially built three different technological abilities – 
absorptive, explorative, and innovative, through three consecutive stages, 
namely duplicative imitation, creative imitation, and innovation. In Hyundai’s 
example, about half of its car models were designed using autonomous 
technologies. In contrast, it seems that the technical capacity of China’s 
automotive industry is still wandering in the stages of “production in scale” and 
partly in “adapted model production,” and applying duplicative rather than 
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creative imitation ability. Although the country has had similar experience 
through CKD and model adaptation, so far it has achieved little success in the 
development of a complete, independent technological capacity. Currently, 
Chinese auto makers have developed certain improvements in body designs over 
previous models. However, they do not have mature, high-level development 
capacity for the whole passenger car and product platform, based on 
independent intellectual property. As a result, they are dependent upon MNC 
IJV partners in product and technological innovations, and lack the decision-
making power on product development and choice (Zhang, & Zeng 2007).  
Today, although passenger cars “made in China” account for 95% of the 
Chinese market, those that are competitive and independently owned by the 
Chinese auto makers are few. 
 
3.2     Firm strategy and technology transfer 
 
What has happened in the Chinese auto companies to prevent them from 
developing independent design technologies during this industry’s phenomenal 
growth? A comparison with their Korean counterparts immediately points to the 
fact that, whereas Korean auto firms adopted an independent development 
strategy, Chinese auto makers have operated as international joint venture (IJV) 
partners, hoping to acquire advanced technologies from MNC partners. 
Progressing through reverse engineering, assimilation, and eventual independent 
design, for example, Hyundai obtained foreign technologies in unpackaged form 
through license agreements with numerous international firms (Lee, 2000). Since 
the technologies did not come from one particular foreign source, Hyundai was 
able to maintain independence from MNCs (Kim, 1997). In this regard, Daewoo 
Motors, another Korean auto maker, offers an interesting contrast. Constrained 
by its joint venture with GM, the company was late in approaching the global 
market and reaping technological assets on imported capital goods (Lee, 2000). 
In comparison, most passenger cars’ assemblers in China are IJVs. Automobiles 
manufactured by the IJVs have topped the list of national brands and taken a 
lion’s share of the fast-growing Chinese market. While the Chinese IJV partners 
have shared the financial outcomes from an ever-expanding auto industry, the 
technologies that are used to design the cars remain largely controlled by the 
MNC partners. 
     The core of technological capability is tacit knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 
1982), which is particularly true in automotive manufacturing (Gallagher, 2003). 
Thus, the inability of Chinese firms to acquire technologies from MNCs seems 
contradictory to the conventional wisdom that joint ventures may offer better 
opportunity,  compared to licensing, for example, to acquire tacit knowledge, 
since joint ventures involve human interaction. However, learning effectiveness 
in joint ventures is determined by the intensity of a partners’ learning intent and 
control structure (Hamel, 1991). At this technological trajectory, the position 
and strategy of the technologically advantageous partners also play an important 
role. At GM’s Shanghai plant, there is no indication of a strong intent toward 
stronger technological capabilities on the part of the Chinese, nor is the U.S. 
partners’ motivation to transfer technologies. The lack of motivation to transfer 
technology from Western JV partners is not surprising, since they built the plant 
in China mainly to occupy the market. “We are here to make money, not to do 
training. If it’s worth it, we can do some training while making money,” 
admitted a senior manager at DaimlerChrysler’s China unit (Gallagher, 2003). In 
Ford’s case, it sounds like a conspiracy that the Chinese partner did not ask for 
more advanced technologies, whereas the U.S. partner felt no obligation to 
transfer them (Gallagher, 2003). Finally, whenever the Chinese partner shows an 
intent to acquire technological know-how from the MNC partner, the power 
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imbalance impedes their learning effectiveness. Ironically, despite their majority 
equity position in the IJV, Chinese partners are always in a weaker position with 
regards to technology transfer in the auto industry (Zhong, 2006). Both 
inadequate R&D investment and shortage of skilled employees prevent them 
from effectively absorbing core technologies through IJVs (Xiong, 2007). In 
summary, the failure of the Chinese auto industry in taking advantage of 
technology transfer through IJVs leads to two broad questions, concerning 
Chinese auto makers’ disincentive and inability to become innovative. 
 
3.3     Incentive to learning and innovation 
 
Most authors credited Korea’s success in developing its auto industry to Korean 
firms’ strong drive toward technological learning, as an entrepreneurial response 
to government policies and regulations, including export targets and incentives, 
price control, trade protection, and restriction of FDI (Hyun, 1995; Kim, 2001). 
Export targets and incentives forced the industry to lift both its technology and 
quality to meet the requirement in advanced foreign markets; price controls 
encouraged the industry to develop its efficiency by cost cutting; restricting FDI 
and the import of technology brought the industry an advanced technical base 
while maintaining management control; and trade protection helped prevent its 
“infant industry” from the assault of foreign makers. Importantly, all these 
measures were implemented with threats as well as promises, thus constructing a 
kind of crisis that effectively pulled and pushed Korean auto makers into a mode 
of active learning and innovation (Kim, 1997). The Chinese government has also 
taken measures to protect its emerging auto industry and had a goal of acquiring 
advanced technologies from the outside world. The key difference is China’s 
domestic orientation versus Korea’s export orientation. Unlike Korea, which has 
a limited domestic market, China enjoys the largest untapped market for 
automotive products. Because the general policy of exchanging markets for 
technology was translated into the firms’ practices in dealing with MNC auto 
makers, export targets have never been seriously negotiated and implemented. 
Import tariffs and local-content-requirements technology helped to create a 
protected market, but the protection has not led to an environment that pushes 
for technological innovations on the part of its domestic players. Instead, these 
measures allow MNC-dominated IJVs to enjoy high returns without concerning 
themselves with outside competition, which in turn diminishes the interest in 
improvement efforts (Farrell et al., 2004). 
     Then how about competition among IJVs, since literally all major MNC auto 
makers have entered China through IJVs? When the first IJVs (American 
Motors and VolksWagen) entered China in the middle of 1980s, the market was 
wide open. Even today, when competition has become increasingly visible, the 
car ownership per capita is still low compared to that of developed countries 
(Dargay, Gately, & Sommer, 2002). The low GNP determines the level of 
demand and therefore the technological sophistication of automobiles demanded 
by Chinese consumers. Thus, the government’s publicized agenda for 
technology transfer has not been translated into concrete requirements with 
regard to FDI regulations in the auto industry, and Chinese IJV partners have not 
shown genuine interest in learning and innovations (Gallagher, 2003). Since the 
development in China’s automotive sector is mainly to meet its domestic 
requirement, its recent growth has a close correlation with China’s GDP growth 
(Advisory, 2005). The large population base offers tremendous domestic market 
potential, with current car ownership at about 0.5 cars per 100 people, compared 
to 50 to 80 cars per 100 people in  the developed countries (Fulcheri, 2005). 
This market potential, combined with a protected environment and a limited 
number of players, has offered the Chinese auto manufacturers a supplier 
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market. However, the lower average consumer income ($3,500–$4,000, 
although it is increasing dramatically) may afford its consumer only lower-end 
products. Thus, the supplier market keeps a higher profit in this segment and 
contributes little, if anything, to developing industry efficiency; a higher growing 
market (or potential market) drives the domestic makers to catch up to the 
market share through expanding production capacity, while a lower-end market 
requirement contributes less initiative or incentive to the local makers to 
concentrate on the lift of technology capacity. Interestingly, the Chinese auto 
companies have been able to export with an annual increase of 15 percent since 
2001 (Beijing Daily, 2006). However, the exports have largely gone to other, 
less developed countries, with a similar pattern for Latin American countries that 
have adopted a “manufacturing culture” (Kaze, 2000). In contrast, Korea, a 
country with one twenty-fourth of the population of China, has a much smaller 
domestic market. Given the auto assembly’s minimum efficient scale of 0.3 
million cars per model (Amsden and Kang, 1995), the imperative for Korean 
firms to go abroad is translated into government priority toward export (Kim, 
2001). Importantly, competing in the international market implies higher 
standards of quality and thus greater technological capabilities in individual 
firms. 
     Finally, it is important to note that the engine of technological capability 
building in Korea’s auto industry is large Chaebols. It is true that a limited 
domestic market and a clear government policy brought pressures on firms to 
innovate. However, all these external factors worked only when individual firms 
entailed an entrepreneurial spirit (Kim & Nelson, 2000). In comparison, the 
parent companies of the Chinese IJV partners are all from the state sector 
(SOEs). As is well documented, the performance incentive and managerial 
discretion of the SOEs are questionable. Evidence has shown that business 
groups in China, which should include major auto makers, are less dynamic than 
Korean Chaebols (Lee and Woo, 2001). 
 
3.4     Government and institutional environments 
 
The inability of Chinese auto firms in learning and innovation has to be 
understood in light of China’s institutional environment, especially in the role of 
the government. In this regard, Korea serves as a contrasting example again. The 
Korean government has clearly played an active and positive role in shaping the 
technology capability of its auto industry (Mukherjee and Sastry, 1996; Kim, 
2001; Ravenhill, 2005). Besides a national innovation agenda and specific 
measures to push forward technological learning in Korean firms, the 
government has also done the following: First, it consistently and effectively 
executed and implemented such strategy and measures. Second, the government 
helped develop an industrial infrastructure conducive to building innovation 
capability. Besides investing heavily in education, the Korean government was 
also directly involved in the R&D activities targeted at key industries. 
Particularly, in the absence of university R&D, the government initially set up 
the Government Research Institute (GRI) by recruiting overseas-trained South 
Korean scientists and engineers. GRI accounted for 83.9 percent of the nation’s 
total R&D expenditures and 43.7 percent of the nation’s researcher pool in 
1970. Third, as mentioned earlier, the government directly interfered in Korean 
firms’ innovation efforts. It is important to note that Korea’s industrialization 
drive in the early 1960s coincided with a strong government. The 
implementation of an automotive industry policy was centralized; the president 
was briefed regularly on the progress of major auto makers in indigenous model 
development (Kim, 1997). 
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There is a popular belief that the Chinese government runs a distinctive policy to 
attract foreign inflow of capital and technology in exchange for the domestic 
market. In the automotive industry, however, a comparison of China to Korea 
suggests the failure of the Chinese government to push forward on autonomous 
technological advancement. First, as discussed in the preceding section, its 
“exchanging technology with market” FDI policy has provided the wrong 
incentive to Chinese firms, which remain passive in learning and innovation. For 
example, the document “Industrial Policy of the Motor Industry” issued by the 
Chinese government in 1994 called for both meeting domestic demand and 
increasing product development capability at the same time (SETCIPD, 2001). 
However, the strong emphasis on supplying the domestic market enhanced the 
import-substitution orientation and contradicted the requirements for building 
product development capability. Clearly, the government’s proclaimed policies 
concerning technology transfer and innovation are inconsistent (Gallagher, 
2003). Second, the government has failed to design and implement policy 
instruments that directly address market failures in the factor markets for 
technological learning (Lall, 1992). A prominent example here is targeted and 
subsidized loans to the local auto industry. This key measure, while proving very 
useful in Korea’s experience, has been made difficult to implement in China due 
to the IJV situation. Or it was, until very recently, when the government decided 
to provide policy credits to one of the Chinese auto makers for autonomous 
R&D purposes (Zhong, 2006). Unlike its Korean counterpart, the Chinese 
government has never actually attached the automotive industry with strategic 
importance, as it did, for example, with the atomic boom. It has asked the auto 
industry to be self-supportive, as far as R&D is concerned. To the Chinese 
government, the main concern with the auto industry is its role in national 
economic development. Only very recently was a consensus reached that the 
auto industry should be treated as the leading industry responsible for the growth 
of many other industries. However, according to a government think tank, this 
consensus has not been reached as a conclusion to the everlasting debate but as a 
realization that the auto industry has progressed into such an industry by itself 
(Chen, Lui, & Feng, 2004). It is thus not surprising that, compared to the Korean 
government’s direct involvement, the Chinese government’s lack of investment 
has left the market’s failures regarding national technology infrastructure 
unaddressed, and has thus weakened the bargaining power of Chinese auto 
makers. 
     Third, the development of China’s automotive industry has been 
accompanied by institutional transformation wherein the power of the central 
government has been significantly weakened. With its “decentralization”-
oriented economic reforms, often the government is not in a strong position to 
effectively implement an industrialization strategy. Power decentralization on 
the provincial level has accomplished two things in the Chinese auto industry: 
made it impossible to develop and effectively implement a national industry 
policy; and given up a major responsibility to guide and lead investment in the 
R&D effort to facilitate technological capability building. Seen as a major 
source of local revenue and employment, auto manufacturing and assembling 
can be found in any of the Chinese provinces except Tibet. Recent efforts by the 
central government to consolidate the industry have been ineffective, and many 
auto firms continue to operate at levels significantly below needed scale 
economies. The industry’s fragmentation has a direct consequence on the way 
local and foreign auto companies interact. Case studies show that, when 
negotiating IJV agreements, local governments have had a tendency to make 
more concessions to MNCs (Peng, 2000). When locally embedded Chinese auto 
makers bid to win a particular IJV deal, a MNC can easily avoid serious 
commitment to technology transfer (Farrell et al., 2004). According to Huang 
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(1997), due to a power shift to the provincial governments, Chinese auto firms 
have failed to achieve socially optimum levels of investment. In an industry with 
clear economic-scale requirements, this fragmented structure effectively impedes 
the building of industry competitiveness. It has been observed that Chinese 
partners often insist on the setup of R&D centers during the negotiation of joint 
ventures, but most of these centers have never carried out substantial R&D 
efforts after their establishment (Holweg, Luo, & Oliver, 2005). 
     The preceding discussions are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1     Factors influencing firm innovation behavior 
 
Sections Features China Korea 
Incentive to be 
innovative 
Domestic market Large but 
unsophisticated 
Much smaller 


















































Quality for export 
 
 
4     Discussion and conclusion 
 
Our comparative analysis traces the failure of the Chinese indigenous auto 
industry to develop autonomous technological capabilities in individual Chinese 
firms, which have not been able to take advantage of potential technology 
transfer through IJVs with MNC auto makers. The failure of Chinese auto 
companies to effectively develop an independent technological capability, 
however, has to be understood in the context of a misleading and ineffective 
policy regime and a fragmented political structure, which in turn are associated 
with a disincentive market environment (i.e., sizable but unsophisticated 
demand) and China’s ongoing systemic restructuring that has so far been 
oriented toward management fragmentation (Boisot & Child, 1988). Important 
policies as well as theoretical implications have emerged from this comparative 
analysis. 
     While technological capability building is considered the driving force in a 
nation’s long-run economic growth, our comparative analysis of automotive 
industry development in China versus Korea confirms that the link between 
technological competence and economic development is to certain extent a 
choice made by the nation. In Korea’s case, the development of autonomous 
technologies was taken as a focal piece in the government’s industrialization 
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strategy. The pressures brought to bear by the government on a significant 
collection of Korean firms resulted in an independent development strategy and 
effective competition against firms based in Western industrial countries. In 
comparison, the government in China opted for an exchange route (market for 
technology) to acquire advanced automotive technologies. While sharing 
phenomenal economic returns with their MNC-IJV partners under the 
government’s trade protection, Chinese auto makers have not been actively 
engaging in technological activities that lead to autonomous competence. Today, 
while both China and Korea have a growing importance within the global 
automotive industry, with comparable production volumes, their impacts are 
nevertheless not the same. With its autonomous technologies and strategic 
posture, the Korean auto industry has become a viable force in the competitive 
international marketplace. On the other hand, the Chinese auto industry, with 
MNC-IJV partners controlling core design technologies, remains largely a 
battleground for international auto makers, and the lack of independent 
technological capability has hampered Chinese auto makers’ attempts to 
effectively participate in the global competition. Huang (2003) criticizes China’s 
FDI policy as “selling China” on the grounds that the policy discriminates 
against indigenous private enterprises and thus sacrifices the long-run viability 
of the national economy The current study suggests that a government policy 
that favors IJVs has led to the delay of building national technological 
capabilities. It is true that FDI through IJVs has accelerated the development of 
a national market for the auto industry. However, it is also true that these 
tremendous market activities are fueled by foreign-owned factors. Given the role 
of technological advancement in a nation’s long-run economic growth potential, 
we may view the contemporary development of the Chinese auto industry as one 
without a concurrent buildup of national industry. 
     Directly responsible for China’s failure in developing a local technological 
base while growing its automotive industry has been the choice of IJVs as the 
mode for international technology transfer. There is a belief that IJVs offer 
better opportunities for human interaction than licensing (Killing, 1980). Based 
on the assumption that automotive design involves a great deal of tacit 
knowledge, IJVs should be a preferred vehicle for acquiring advanced 
technologies in the auto industry. However, the learning effectiveness of the 
technology-seeking partner is dependent upon several factors, including the 
intensity and clarity of the partner’s learning intent and the power relations 
between the partner and the other side of the IJV (Hamel, 1991). In the current 
case, the Chinese partner did not have a strong and elaborated learning agenda, 
and its bargaining power was weak and actually has been weakened, due to the 
government’s decision-making decentralization and passivity with regard to 
national technological infrastructure. 
     The critique on China’s failure of technology competence building may be 
overstated. Instead, some people believe that the country has been following a 
natural path that is now directed at more aggressive innovation (Zhong, 2006). 
Recent announcements of the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation 
(SAIC) and others indicate the awakening of Chinese auto firms with regard to 
national technology capability development. However, the catch-up in learning 
is path-dependent (Teece, 2000). With the current level of internationalization in 
the automotive industry, it is no longer possible for China to exclude foreign 
investment in developing its national market, as has been done in Korea (Chen et 
al., 2004). Particularly, since all major Chinese firms are now tied with IJV 
partners, their independent development efforts will either be consciously 
obstructed or even challenged by the MNCs on grounds such as intellectual 
property violations. Some Chinese auto analysts suggest that Chinese auto 
makers should start making stronger demands for sharing technologies from the 
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IJV platforms, based on the assumption that MNCs will have to make 
concessions for fear of being forced out of the lucrative business ventures 
they’ve built over the years (Zhong, 2006). However, its newly granted WTO 
membership has effectively limited China’s ability to demand technology 
transfer from international auto companies. This leaves what is probably the 
only feasible alternative for Chinese auto makers, that is, to build an 
independent platform for autonomous technology development. The Korean 
experience suggests that a strong, determined government can do much to 
facilitate the creation of an economic and institutional environment toward 
national technological activities – and therefore a competitive national industry. 
However, it remains questionable to what extent China could give up its 
differential treatments toward state-owned versus private firms in the automotive 
sectors, with two non-state auto makers having most visible indigenous brands at 
the present time. While the government may be able to make possible 
consolidations, leading to fewer and larger auto groups in the state sector, the 
question of whether an entrepreneurial spirit could emerge in these Chinese 
“Chaebols” will ultimately determine their viability and success in their catch-up 
game with the competitive global automotive market. 
     When reading this comparative study, largely drawn on historical evidence, 
the audience should bear in mind its inherent limitations as research strategy. 
We compare China to South Korea with a focus on their approach toward 
technology innovation in augmenting industrial development. However, this 
reference point is by no means perfect, given the different social, economic, and 
institutional environments between the two countries. Additionally, the use of 
historical “facts” will inevitably rely on interpretation. For these reasons, we will 
have to come up with more convincing statements with complementary 
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